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Mental health is not the object of study of only one discipline, but of different fields of knowledge 
including anthropology. If it is considered that (1) mental illness is related to learning and (2) learning 
happens in a relational context between the subject and his/her environment, it is possible to assume 
that a change in the context could mean changes in the subject’s health. Therefore, an approximation to 
the concept of “cure” may include the idea of building and reforming a habit of thought. By modifying a 
habit of thought, the individual can change their situation and improve their relationships with the 
environment, which tends to re-equilibration and health. In this work, this hypothesis is developed and  
empirical evidence was shown with five Wernicke Korsakoff’s Syndrome inpatients learning to solve 
the Tower of Hanoi that supports the assumptions. Conversely to what is expected to amnesic people, 
empirical results showed that the participants not only learned the task (proto-learning) but also 
improved their execution with practise and training (deutero-learning) and reached some level of 
flexibility. It is suggested that this behavioural change depends, at least in part, on the context created 
in the examiner-participant relationship. People are not ill per se but they are ill only in relation to an 
environment which surrounds and conditions them. 
 





Despite being associated with the mind-body separation, 
which is groundless, mental health is not the object of 
study of only one discipline, but of different fields of 
knowledge such as cognitive anthropology, medicine, 
psychology, pedagogy and others. In the case of 
cognitive anthropology, its aim is to elucidate the 
underlying principles of behaviour, assuming that each 
person (and culture) has their own  system  of  perception 
and organization of the world-environment. 
Mental health is one of the main aspects of human 
behaviour and is characterized by a series of standards 
or learning thresholds. In this paper behaviour is 
understood as “(...) all action directed by the organisms 
toward the outside world in order to change conditions 
therein or to change their own situation in relation to 
these surroundings” (Piaget, 1978: IX).  
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The notion of vection (Piaget, 1977) refers to the 
gradually increasing opening to new possibilities of 
interaction with the environment, an increase in open 
behavioural adaptations which tend to expand the 
cognoscibility and liveability of the environment.  While 
the occurrence of internal movements such as blood 
circulation or the changes produced by the function of 
respiration on the atmosphere are not understandable as 
behaviours, it is assumed that behaviour tends to modify 
the relationships between the organism and its 
environment (Piaget, 1978). 
Lahitte and Hurrell (1990) explained the difference 
between activity and behaviour since, if speaking about 
behaviour, the term needs to be referred to a context of 
significance: the intentional factor of behaviour makes it 
capable of being explained in communicational terms. 
According to the context of observation, acts will be 
qualified as behavioural or non-behavioural because the 
concept of behaviour depends on the context in which the 
observation (of the behaviour) was made. 
Behavioural relationships are not internal to the 
individual: although changes occur in the terms of the 
relationship which correspond to its dependence-
protection, the relationship as such is precedent. That 
means that the understanding of behaviour through the 
concept of relationship yields to a novel logical kind of 
learning which was named by Bateson (1993) learning II 
or deutero-learning. 
In this context, it is possible to address different kinds 
of learning, which is understood as changes in behaviour 
acquired through experience (frequently by repeated 
experience) which propitiate the adaptation of the 
organism by means of re-equilibration and self-regulation. 
In this paper mental health is seen as closely related to 
the individual’s learning: 
 
“Lo que en algún momento entendíamos como 
enfermedad o patología o desviación social son, en 
realidad, nuevas propiedades que adquieren los seres 
humanos cuando alteran su condición de equilibrio. 
Estas formas que podríamos entender como nuevas 
propiedades se estabilizan como patologías en las que el 
sistema, el sujeto en su conjunto es sometido a fuertes 
condicionamientos del medio (relacional, familiar, 




As far as the authors of this paper know, the perspective 
of learning in mental health from an anthropological-
educational point of view is not an usual issue in the 
health bibliography; therefore, this work tends to 
contribute with a perspective which intends to reunite 
points of  view  that  otherwise  are  separated  one  from 
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 What we before thought of as illness or pathology or social deviation are, 
indeed, new properties that human beings acquire when they change their 
equilibrium condition.  These forms which we could understand as new 
properties are stabilized as pathologies in which the system, the complete 
individual is subjected to hard environmental constraints (such as relational, 






If it is considered that (1) mental illness is related to 
learning and (2) learning happens in a relational context 
between the subject and their environment, it can be 
assumed that a change in the context could mean 
changes in the subject’s health. Therefore, an 
approximation to the concept of “cure”
2
 may include the 
idea of building and reforming a habit and an ambit of 
thought (a pattern of learned behaviour that could be 
transferred to another space which in turn can be 
influenced or not by the context involved); this can affect 
the person’s quality of life. In this paper it is assumed, as 
a hypothesis, that by modifying a habit of thought, the 
individual can change their situation and this can mean 
an improvement in their relationships with the 
environment, which tends to re-equilibration and, in turn, 
benefits the subject’s health. In this work it is developed 
this hypothesis and showed empiric evidence that 
supports this assumption. 
 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
A mixed methodological approach was applied to develop the 
paper: the main method was the argumentation and the second 
one, which takes the form of a quasi-experimental design, was 
nested into the first one as a strategy to present and support the 
main hypothesis. First, it was developed a theoretical hypothesis 
based on bibliographical analysis and synthesis, using the 
argumentation as the main method. 
Secondly, the hypothesis was illustrated with an empirical case 
that follows a quasi-experimental design with a convenience 
sample of five male, middle-aged inpatients with Wernicke-
Korsakoff’s Syndrome who showed anterograde amnesia 
(sometimes retrograde too) and executive problems. The 
instrument was a commercial version of the Tower of Hanoi and it 
was developed a sequential procedure to probe the participants’ 
learning. 
The learning procedure follows the dynamic assessment 
principles (cfr. Bacigalupe et al., 2011) in a quasi-experimental 
setting with pre and post-tests, considering the individual as his 
own control. The pre-test consisted of a single application of the 
Tower of Hanoi with 5 rings with no other assistance that the 
explanation of the rules to follow (to move one ring per time and 
never put one bigger ring upon a smaller one) and the final 
objective (to form the pile in the opposite axis from departure, with 
the biggest ring on the base and the smallest ring on the top). The 
post-test consisted of a single application of the Tower of Hanoi 
with minor assistance from the examiner (a second trial during the 
same session was allowed if necessary); this time the number of 
rings varied according to the best performance achieved by the 
participant during the training period, from 2 to 5 rings. The training 
period consisted of ten sessions of teaching-learning in which the 
examiner (MAB) assisted the participants, helped them to 
remember the rules and final objective, and served them as an 
“external frontal lobe” to control their automatic behaviour. More 
detailed explanation of procedures can be found in the open-access 
journal   paper  by  Bacigalupe  et  al.  (2013).  Ethical  norms  were 
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 It is relevant to make it clear that this paper presents an anthropological-
educational perspective as a contribution to an integral and interdisciplinary 
view of mental illness but that the authors are not able to write as if they had 
the specific knowledge of medicine; therefore in this paper the word “cure” is 





followed on conducting the research (Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights, 33rd UNESCO’s General Conference, 
2005; Helsinki Declaration, 18th World Medical Assembly, Finland, 
1964 and its amendments). 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Learning contexts, cognition and problem solving 
 
In this work it is assumed that there exists five learning 
contexts which are classified into two sub-groups: 
positive learning (learning to do), and negative learning 
(learning to inhibit actions). Two kinds of stimuli are 
present in both of them: conditioned and unconditioned 
stimuli. The five learning contexts are: (a) problem 
solving, (b) pavlovian context, (c) instrumental reward, (d) 
instrumental avoiding, and (e) serial or mnemonic 
context. 
Learning contexts gradually build habits of thought 
which, once formed, function as behavioural premises in 
the subject. Authors of this paper assume that habits of 
thought depend on the contexts and stimuli, and 
changing any of them, habits can acquire new forms and, 
eventually, become flexible. 
Proto-learning and deutero-learning are two kinds of 
learning gradients. Proto-learning or first-order learning 
(Bateson, 1972/1998) refers to classic and instrumental 
conditioning, and mnemonic learning. Zero-learning (the 
reception of signals or external information) is a kind of 
learning which precedes proto-learning. Finally, deutero-
learning or second-order learning is a kind of learning 
which arises as a proto-learning gradient when it is 
applied some repetition or practice on the same topic, as 
a result of which the execution time or the quantity of 
mistakes improve progressively. In this way, people can 
develop patterns of behaviour which can be transferred to 
other contexts. In this case, deutero-learning can be a 
kind of learning to learn. At this point it is relevant to state 
what is the meaning of cognition from the point of view of 
the authors of this paper. Héctor (Lahitte and Hurrell, 
1995; Lahitte and Ortiz Oria, 2005) points out that the aim 
of the anthropologists who work on cognitive 
anthropology is the recognition of the observation points 
from which the ens universale is configured and 
expressed in each society, which results in a cognitive 
style (Maruyama, 1980; 1992), a general vision shared by 
every member of that society. The term cognition names 
such questions: in a figurative sense cognition means 
what is configured, what is built. 
The term cognition involves some kind of internal 
representation of the external world and the organization 
of sensory information in internal models. Depending on 
the circumstances in which it is expected to find it, 
cognition can be understood as adaptation, and it neither 
makes sense in contexts of maximum variability (having 
an internal map does not make sense if the territory is 
constantly changing) nor in zero  variability  contexts  (cfr. 




Lahitte et al., 2006). The function of cognitive brain 
mechanisms permits predictive processing, understood 
as any type of processing which generates not only 
information about the past or the present, but also future 
states of the body or the environment; in this sense, 
predictive processing helps to generate goal-directed and 
adapted behaviour (Bubic et al., 2010). 
What is characteristic of human cognition according to 
Tomasello (2000) is the possibility that human beings 
have to aggregate cognitive resources in a truly original 
manner.  The author distinguishes human cultural 
learning from other kinds of social learning and includes 
within the first learning by imitation, learning by 
instruction and collaborative learning. These three kinds 
of cultural learning are possible thanks to a particular 
form of social cognition, which is the ability of human 
beings to understand their conspecifics as themselves, 
with an intentionality and mental life like their own. This 
understanding makes people able to put themselves in 
the place of others “so that they can learn not just from 
the other but through the other” (Tomasello, 2000: 6)
3
. 
Specifically, human cognition, according to Tomasello 
(2000), is the result of a kind of species-specific cultural 
transmission.  Traditions and artefacts incorporate 
modifications in the course of time with a ratchet effect by 
which some processes cannot go back once they have 
happened. The process of cultural accumulation requires 
not only the creative invention but also, and 
fundamentally, faithful social transmission which works as 
a ratchet to avoid regressions and losses. In this way, a 
new practice or artefact faithfully preserves its 
characteristics until a further modification or improvement 
occurs which will be learned by others, preserved and 
eventually modified and the whole process will be 
repeated. The dynamics of the instruction-learning 
linkage allows to conceive cognition not merely centered 
in the individual but as the result of a relationship. 
These assumptions about cognition imply that learning 
processes are not necessarily placed in the brain, but 
that cognition is an extended process (Broncano, 2007; 
Clark, 1999; 2004; Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Sprevak, 
2020). The authors of this paper think that learning 
happens in the individual-context interaction and the 
environment where this relationship takes place can be 
called learning context. Among the above mentioned 
learning contexts, the problem solving environment 
brings into play the concept of transference. 
Transference is defined as the ability to expand what has 
been learnt in a given context to new contexts (Bransford 
et al., 2002; UNESCO, 2013), thus gaining access to an 
ample group of purposes and intentions. 
In this paper, it is made a distinction between (a) 
simple, automatic procedures in exercises, and (b) 
strategic procedures of problem solving, which constitute 
one variety of deutero-learning. The first step in 
procedural learning is  occupied  by  the  techniques  and 
                                                          
3 Italics are from the original text 




sequences of actions developed routinely (Pozo, 2000). 
These are not single habits learned implicitly by 
reinforcement or by exposure to a model, but are 
composed by sequences of actions learned by repetition 
and by explicit, associative training until they become 
automatic procedures. Techniques are useful to cope 
with exercises. However, when there is variation in any 
part of the situation of an exercise, it becomes a problem 
because the sequential repetition of the steps learned is 
not enough to get a solution and the subject requires to 
develop a strategy. This is the second step in procedural 
learning and consists in the utilization of techniques in 
new or complex situations in which techniques must be 
adapted to specific demands. The acquisition of 
strategies requires constructive learning more than 
associative learning. In this process, people develop 
reflection on their own practice, and re-elaborate their 
actions according to self-assessment. One particular type 
of strategy is learning to learn and self-monitor of one’s 
own learning, which implies learning to use reflection 
about one’s own knowledge, also known as 
metacognition.  The higher level of procedural learning is 
learning to learn, and problem solving, which is supported 
by working memory processes (Gray et al., 2003; Lezak, 
1995; Thompson, 1993). 
The concept of cognitive flexibility is the key factor for 
the distinction between solving a simple exercise or 
problem, and solving a problem, and can be illustrated by 
novices and experts’ performances. The difference 
between merely skilled and highly competent people can 
be observed in a variety of fields of knowledge and 
implies a kind of flexible expertise. The concept of 
adaptive expertise (cfr. Bransford et al., 2002) provides 
an important learning model. Adaptive experts are able to 
approach new situation flexibly and can learn along their 
whole lives. They not only use what they have learnt but 
also develop their metacognition and permanently 
question their expertise level in order to surpass 
themselves.  
The concept of metacognition, which characterises 
adaptive expertise, was originally introduced in the 
context of children studies and refers to the ability to self-
monitor their present comprehension level and to decide 
when it is not adequate (Bransford et al., 2002). Daily 
problem solving involves cognitive processes related to 
the access and manipulation of previous knowledge 
which is relevant to a present problem, the generation of 
appropriate strategies, the inhibition of inappropriate or 
routine responses which are not applicable and the ability 
to judge the efficiency of the solution. Furthermore, daily 
problem solving involves emotional and social abilities. 
These daily problems share some properties with 
neuropsychological or structured problem solving tasks 
applied in laboratories, in which the sequence can be 
characterized by recognition, difference-distinction, and 
type. However, daily problems differ from laboratory ones 





have an open and relative end, there exist competing 
properties depending on the context, and it is necessary 
to include the point of view of others and to have an 
adequate social-contextual knowledge. Furthermore, the 
potential consequences of solution alternatives should be 
examined and pondered (Channon, 2004). 
Cerebral fontal dysfunction can be associated with 
difficulties in different aspects of problem solving 
including working memory; for example, a decrement in 
the efficiency of using previous knowledge can be 
observed as a result of a memory deficit in the generation 
of search strategies (Channon, 2004). Behavioural 
disturbances associated with frontal lobe lesion can be 
summarised as follows (Baddeley, 1999; Lezak, 1995): 1. 
Initiation problems: a decrement in the rate of behaviour 
emission and a decrement or complete loss of initiative, a 
loss of spontaneity and productivity, and, sometimes, 
apathy, muteness or the absence of response (with 
respect to some reference from the observer); 2. 
Perseveration and difficulties in making mental or 
behavioural shifts; 3. Trouble finishing: loss of control, 
impulsivity, over-reactivity, disinhibition and difficulties to 
avoid wrong, unwanted answers, particularly if they are 
part of a current chain response; 4. Deficit in self-
consciousness: deficit in self-criticism, inability to see 
execution mistakes, to appreciate the impact of the self 
on others and adequately evaluate a social situation; the 
sense of the self seems to be very vulnerable in people 
with frontal lesions; and 5. Concreteness: incapacity to 
dissociate themselves from the immediate context, in 
which objects, experiences and behaviours are 
understood from their most obvious aspect, resulting in 
an incapacity to plan and sustain a behaviour driven by 
objectives. Although many of these patients show an 
inability to manipulate abstract concepts and can only 
generate concrete concepts spontaneously, others 
preserve a high degree of conceptual abilities in spite of 




Problem solving in a mnemonic learning context with 
people with amnesic and executive deficits: A 
possibility 
 
Tower tasks involve problem solving functions and 
transference in which the examinee must rearrange some 
discs or little balls by a minimal number of movements in 
order to make them match the model or reach the 
established final objective. 
Developed on the basis of Simon’s model of the Tower 
of Hanoi, tower tasks help to assess executive functions 
and problem solving. It is agreed that they primarily 
involve planning (Anderson and Douglass, 2001; Lezak, 
1995; Newman et al., 2003; Riccio et al., 2004; Spreen 
and Strauss, 1998): if people plan movements and 





would be involved in the development of a more efficient 
problem solving strategy. 
Tower tasks have rules to follow to reach the final 
solution: they vary in the successive versions and have 
different structures and ways of assessing execution 
(Riccio et al., 2004). The process of solution of tower 
tasks synthesises two models about executive functions 
(Newman et al., 2003)
4
: Shallice’s information-processing 
model, published in 1982 (Shallice, 1982; Baddeley, 
1999; Newman et al., 2003), and Newell’s model which 
was published in 1990 (Newman et al., 2003). 
According to the first model, there are two cognitive 
control paths in executive functions: (a) routine-like, 
bottom-up and perceptually driven and (b) strategic, top-
down and driven by objectives. 
On the other hand, Newell’s theory poses that problem 
solving involves a sequence of cycles of four stages 
each: (a) deliberation, in which all the alternative 
operators are considered in parallel, (b) parallel 
computation of preferences between pairs of operators, 
which Lahitte (1981) calls learning in increasing 
complexity, where each preference refers to the fact that 
one operator is preferable to another, (c) decision making 
by organising preferences to select the best operator, 
and (d) application of the selected operator to the current 
state so as to produce a new state. However, if any one 
of the preconditions to apply the operator is not satisfied, 
it will be necessary to put forward sub-objectives to reach 
the preconditions before applying the selected operator in 
this fourth phase. 
The two models, Shallice’s and Newell’s theories, work 
together because while the ordinary approach to solve 
the tower is guided perceptually by proposing operators 
which enhance visual similitude, trying to reduce the 
range between the initial state and the goal state (without 
taking into account whether preconditions are achieved), 
the strategic, non routine approach takes control when 
these conditions are not met, thus creating sub-objectives 
to satisfy preconditions (although they can enlarge the 
perceptual distance between the initial and the final state 
of the tower). Once the preconditions are satisfied, the 
perceptual mode regains control to apply the original 
perceptual operator. 
It has been shown that thinking aloud can help solve 
the tower. Instead of representing a mere verbalisation, 
thinking aloud might be some form of metacognition 
resulting in an incremented effort to produce a self-
explanation of the process to reach the solution (Noyes 
and Garland, 2003). This could be illustrated in the 
following example with the Tower of Hanoi (see below for 
details of our research). The patient can use the 
technique of thinking aloud without metacognition (mere 
verbalisation) if they say “this ring here, the other there” 
and “the little ring on the bigger  one”  but  their  action  is 
                                                          
4 Even though Newman et al. refer specifically to the Tower of London, we 
consider that their hypothesis can be expanded to similar tower tasks like the 
Tower of Hanoi 




dissociated from what he/she is saying and this is mere 
verbalisation, which does not guide his/her actions but is 
independent and not coordinated with the procedure. 
Instead, if the patient’s words help him/her to understand 
that he/she is making a wrong movement and thanks to 
this comprehension he/she can change the strategy on 
the spot, he/she is using thinking aloud as a 
metacognitive technique. 
Considering the depicted conditions in tower tasks, it 
would be supposed that patients with anterograde 
amnesia (sometimes retrograde too) and executive 
problems such as people with Korsakoff’s syndrome 
should not be able to learn to solve the task in a 
mnemonic learning context (proto-learning) and even less 
by the highest level of deutero-learning. The participants 
were Wernicke-Korsakoff’s syndrome patients learning to 
solve the Tower of Hanoi (Anderson, 1995; Anderson and 
Douglass, 2001; Lezak, 1995; Spreen and Strauss, 
1998). 
One of the most important characteristic of problem 
solving tasks is the search of a sequence of steps that 
allows solvers to pass from the current state to the target 
one (Anderson, 1995), in which planning is the main 
process.  The Tower of Hanoi is useful to measure the 
individual’s planning during a problem solving process in 
which they face a platform with three axes (A, B, and C) 
and a number of rings which differ in their diameter piled 
from the biggest (at the bottom of the axis A) to the 
smallest (at the top of the same axis). The problem is 
how to form the same pile in axe C, taking into account 
that the rings must move from one to the other axis of the 
game with certain conditions (for example, it is not 
possible to leave a ring on the table or hold it while 
another is being moved). This is done by following two 
rules: (a) to move the rings one by one and (b) never to 
arrange a bigger ring on a smaller one. The Tower of 
Hanoi has been applied during four repeating sessions 
with an interval of one to seven days between sessions 
(Spreen and Strauss, 1998), which allowed researchers 
to observe several issues such as the development of a 
planning strategy, the long term storage of successes 
and failures during the resolution, and the benefit the 
patient takes from their own experience, among other 
relevant aspects. This model of tower tasks has been 
applied as a problem solving and executive functions test 
(Numminen et al., 2001). 
In the research showed here it was used a commercial 
version of the Tower of Hanoi. It was supposed that the 
participants who worked with the Tower along the training 
sessions would be able to solve increasingly complex 
instances with adequate pedagogical support. It is 
understand here that adequate pedagogical support 
should be a kind of teaching which (a) works according to 
cognitive neuroscience and the relational framework of 
anthropology, (b) respects diversity, and (c) generates 
effective didactic tools.  The level of complexity is defined 
as the quantity of rings each subject was working with, for 
example  if  the  patient  was  working   with   five   rings   the 




level of complexity was considered to be five. Two crucial 
issues in our research were: 1. The possibility to learn to 
solve the task (independently from the quantity of 
movements and the time consumed in the task), and 2. 
The quantity of movements of the execution: it was 
supposed that fewer movements and a successful 
execution mean a higher efficacy of execution. 
Results from our research showed that during the pre-
test the patients were incapable to solve the tower with a 
five-ring complexity. Pre-test consisted in a single 
session of traditional assessment, in which the role of the 
examiner (MAB) was limited to explaining to the patients 
the rules and the task objective with no other kind of 
intervention but the observation of the patients’ 
behaviour.  This mnemonic learning context can be called 
“traditional context”. 
During the training sessions the same examiner worked 
with the patients following the precepts of dynamic 
assessment (Bacigalupe et al., 2011), beginning the 
practise with a minimal number of rings and progressively 
increasing the level of complexity by adding more rings 
according to the particularities of each patient’s 
performance. This increment in complexity was carried 
out with adequate guidance and intervention from the 
examiner. It is possible to call this learning context 
“dynamic context”. Along the sessions the patients were 
able to improve not only the level of complexity and 
completeness of the task but also their self-monitoring. 
The post-test consisted in a similar session to the pre-test 
in a traditional context but each patient was asked to 
solve the tower with the level of complexity that they had 
reached during the training. This means that if they had 
solved the tower successfully with three rings and not 
with four or five rings, the post-test consisted in solving 
the tower with three rings. It is noteworthy to observe the 
particular way each patient was achieving task goals, 
with an own rhythm and idiosyncratic style of learning. 
While their learning progressed, each participant was 
developing a new relationship with his environment (the 
material and the examiner), a co-constructing relationship 
in which each one, the environment and the patient, 
modified each other. 
Patient 1 was able to achieve the optimal solution of 
the task with two rings independently, which was an 
important learning result considering their constant 
impulsivity, easily fatigue, and permanent lack of 
confidence in his possibility of progress, apart from his 
executive dysfunction. During the training sessions he 
was able to recognize the times he was breaking the 
rules and he achieved the task with five rings but with the 
permanent assistance of the examiner. 
Patient 2 achieved the optimal solution without any 
prompting from the examiner with two rings, and with the 
assistance of the examiner he was able to improve his 
execution with more rings including the five ones. 
Sometimes his language was dissociated from his action, 





could improve his memory of the rules and kept the 
objective in mind. His self-regulation and persistence in 
action achievement were improved from the first sessions 
to the post-test. 
Patient 3 got the 4 rings level independently in the post-
test. During the training the patient showed that the use 
of verbalization helped the direction of his action; 
besides, he achieved the level of five rings with the 
assistance of the examiner. From a behaviour 
characterized by the persistence in violating the rules in 
the pre-test, the patient was getting control on his action 
and self-regulation through the sessions, remembering 
the objective and the rules to follow. 
Patient 4 showed a particular performance 
characterized by impulsivity and concrete thinking, and a 
relative rejection to be prompted by the examiner; 
therefore the assistance was rather cautious and takes 
more the form of following his line of thinking that openly 
helps him to change it. Even so, he was able to optimally 
solve the tower with 2 rings the first training day, and 
continue improving his performance but with an 
excessive number of movements and committing lots of 
mistakes. The post-test showed a complete absence of 
recognition of having worked with the tower before and 
no memory of the rules; but, once the rules were 
repeated, his performance showed learning: he achieved 
the 5 ring level but with some mistakes that required 
some external help and lots of unnecessary movements 
to get the final solution. 
The performance of the patient 5 in the pre-test was 
similar to the rest of the participants, with no possibilities 
to think in a valid strategy to solve the problem and 
difficulties to retain the rules and the objective. During the 
training the patient was able to make a significative 
progress from the 2 rings difficulty to the 5 rings solution 
and got a progressive self-regulation in following the rules 
and achieving the objective. The post-test showed a 
stunning response solving the 5 rings difficulty of the task 
in the second chance without help nor errors; and he was 
able to get a kind of learning transference through solving 
the tower in an inverse direction. He showed a capability 
of deutero-learning, mental flexibility and learning from 
his own experience. 
In comparison, while patients 3, 4 and 5 were able to 
learn the task with a 5 rings complexity, patient 2 
achieved the 5 rings level with much more difficulties and 
patient 1 got a minor level of complexity of the task. 
Besides, the participants who achieved the 5 rings level 
of complexity of the task showed interindividual 
differences, showing that patient 4 was the less efficient 
(more movements to solve the same complexity level); 
the performance of the patient 5 was the most successful 
because he was able to solve the maximum level of 
difficulty with total independence of the examiner help 
and was able to transfer his learning by solving the tower 
in an inverse form. 





only learned the task (proto-learning) but also improved 
their execution with practise and training (deutero-
learning) and reached some level of flexibility and 
metacognition, which was different from patient to patient.  
It is suggested here that this behavioural change 
depended, at least in part, on the context (the “dynamic 
context”) created by the examiner-participant relationship, 
the way the examiner prompted their execution and the 





Understanding cognition as extended or mediated means 
is adopting a fundamental methodological and 
epistemological decision. This not only implies 
consequences in the philosophical postures about the 
mind and research in cognitive sciences but also has 
social and ethical derivations. 
In the field of education one of the consequences of 
this perspective is found in the role of educators as 
learning mediators or vygotskyan scaffolds, working on 
the learner’s zone of proximal development and 
promoting an active inclusion of people in their culture. 
Another consequence of this perspective can be found in 
medical sciences, in which a systemic point of view can 
consider that people are not ill per se but they are ill only 
in relation to an environment which surrounds and 
conditions them. This means that the concept of health 
and illness depend on a given cultural perspective. 
Therefore, medical sciences are interested not only in the 
patients but also in their environment, and look into the 
social and physical factors which can influence the loss of 
the balance that frequently defines the term health. 
Delineating an idea of “mental health” requires two 
explanations: 1. To understand the system as healthy or 
ill, according to the diagnostic criteria of “normality” and 
“abnormality”, and 2. The researcher should accept that 
the criteria of “normality” and “abnormality” are closely 
related to a consensus on acceptance and rejection of 
certain behaviours, which arise from a co-existence of 
consensual coordination. 
This means that “the idea of mental health” is 
conceivable only in the ambit of the social dynamics 
which delineate it. In other words, this idea depends on 
the subject or participants who experience it and the 
context of recurrent emotional contradictions. This form of 
learning and showing emotions is what finally can or 
cannot make people ill. 
Attempting to link learning and “cure”, and attempting to 
understand whether a cognitive system works adequately 
implies understanding when and how somebody’s 
behaviour becomes part of a world of meaning which is 
pre-existent or new and consensual. It is relevant to this 
perspective to point out that representations no longer 
have a central role that “intelligence” is no longer 
responsible for solving a problem or manipulating several 




material resources, even though it is the capacity to enter 
a shared world. This means that the idea of this paper is 
beyond the measurement of the benefit of changes in the 
scale and time of the performance in the resolution of 
specific tasks. The authors' point of view goes beyond in 
the same direction but comprising the temporality of living 
in a shared world from where the social phenomenon 
emerges. The goal is to find an endogenous activity 
which matches with the optimal codification of the 
environmental regularity; in short, to find a cognitive 
system in which the endogenous and exogenous 
phenomena are defined by a viable link. 
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